Myth and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus

The word “soul” (along with the word “knowledge”) is one of the more frequently conflated terms in human parlance (in English, Ancient Greek or just about any other language). So, in conversation, you always want to ask what someone means by the term, for there are religious, philosophical, psychological connotations – and all the combinations in-between - to that word. Taking the concept generally, there appear to be two common elements: 1) that soul, as an individuated yet highly rarefied sense-of-self, exists (whether eternally or not is often the driving question); and 2), that this soul, as an individuated yet rarefied sense-of-self, possesses some fundamental attributes. Thus, if you want to understand the historical trajectory of this term within Western Civilization, you might pick up the Bible, or alternatively you also might pick up a copy of Plato’s Phaedrus. There, some 2,500 years ago, set in a culture embued with heroics, a profound sense of curiosity and, perhaps just as profound, a sense of the divinity of life, Plato embarked on an exploration of this concept. Set within the mythical Palinode, Plato described soul (psyche, ψυχή) as a self-moving eternal principle that secondarily possessed a tripartite division. After positing this definition and this structure he proceeded in a highly nuanced way to explore how this conception could (or would) help us to philosophically understand and transformationally position ourselves relative to the activities of both erotic loving and rhetorical knowing. Plato’s exploration of soul then, in the Phaedrus, occurring as it did at the dawn of Western civilization’s attempts to reflexively question itself, took place within a dialog filled with myths. The question naturally arises, how should we approach this mythic element in Plato? And specifically, how did Plato conceive of myth’s truth status as well as its relationship to reason within this dialog? Daniel Werner’s “Myth and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus” is a book that asks precisely these questions. It is a well-researched read, interesting and helpful for scholars and novices alike. Thus, Werner’s deeply contextualized, insightful analysis explores how Plato used myth in the Phaedrus to express notions about the soul and its constitution that might otherwise evade a purely rational means of knowing and/or explication. He argues that for Plato, myth’s truth status is neither exclusively dogmatic nor debunking but somewhere in-between. Simultaneously, Werner also argues that, like Plato, he is not out to glorify myth nor to argue that Plato’s use of it here is intended to be a vehicle for expressing ideas that exclusively “transcend reason” or “lie beyond the capabilities of rational argument” (something he terms the Yogic View). Thus here, in his book, Werner tries to show that while Plato took pains to illumine the inherent strengths and weaknesses of myth, at the same time and also somewhat paradoxically, he used these same myths to both define and delimit the scope of the dialectical method. This paradox - and the epistemic horizon it implicates - deserve more attention (I think) than Werner (or even Plato) might have been willing to grant. If we return to the general points concerning soul that were mentioned above, we can see that Plato defined soul first and foremost as an eternal principle. This was accomplished by embedding a logical proof within the Palinode myth. The proof, which argued for eternality, was based on the perception of bodily self-motion. (Such a thesis could make sense to an age which defined motion through the sense perceptions of the naked eye; finer resolution visual tools now render such a thesis inviable, or at the very least, just kick the self-motion-thesis-can down the road.) But conceiving of soul as an individuating (that is, separating) aspect connected to the sense-of-self was in fact something presupposed by Plato. And dissolving this separation, as a concept, constitutes in essence the Yogic View referred to by Werner. Thus, this concept (the sense of separateness apparently entailed in defining one’s sense of self) appears to have been off Plato’s philosophic radar. In fact, Werner argues that, due to Plato’s clear emphasis on dialectical (propositional) methods of inquiry (and not myth per se), he cannot be construed to promote the meditational methods used to effect such a dissolution. I would agree with Werner’s assessment and further add that Plato’s conception of the soul was inextricably linked to his recognition of the animated and animating bodily energies of self-motion referred to earlier, a phenomenon which Vedanta calls the “I am the body idea”. Relative to structure, since soul as principle was proven to exist eternally in the Palinode, Plato, still within the Palinode suggests through the use of an analogy, that it possesses an ontologically scaled tripartite structure. The structure being: intellect, courageous passion and bodily impulses (for sex, food, sleep, etc…). But how he has come to derive these three elements is never clearly stated (here, it is argued for in Republic). And due to the implications of soul’s eternal existence (described through the permutations of lifetimes and/or even animal embodiments) the presence of such a structure suggests the possibility - even necessity - of individual purification. The practice of “divine” philosophy, then, as purification, meant enlisting the help of the courageous-passions to bolster the energetically weaker intellect, as they remained united in their effort to hold the anarchic bodily impulses – or those of others – at bay. This purifying practice then was centered in the intellect which, in its turn, relied on revelations proceeding from the higher realms of both Gods and Forms. Myth then, as it was used by Plato in the Phaedrus, explored the eternal nature of the soul, its fate after death and its structural components: concepts which could only be intelligent guess-work for an upward reaching dialectical inquiry. Both Plato and Werner admit as much: “In myth (no less than in argument) Plato can put forward only a guess regarding the fate of the soul, while consciously acknowledging that it is only a guess; in myth he can offer an image of the nature of the soul, while consciously acknowledging that it is only an image; and in myth he can tell us something about the Forms, while consciously acknowledging that their full nature eludes description” (Werner, page 102). This whole structure then, though only a likely story, has in fact influenced not only the practice of philosophy but also the practice of embodied living (in varying degrees) for 2500 years. Dialectic’s epistemic horizon here, teased by Platonic myth, might remain impenetrable as long as the experience of psychological dissolution, arising from the Yogic View’s meditative method, is viewed as having little to offer the arsenal of Western Philosophy’s concepts. If that were to change, much could change. Werner’s book is, as is Plato’s Phaedrus, then, a step in the right direction. Bravo!

Exellent

The word “soul” (along with the word “knowledge”) is one of the more frequently conflated terms in human parlance (in English, Ancient Greek or just about any other language). So, in conversation, you always want to ask what someone means by the term, for there are religious, philosophical, psychological connotations – and all the combinations in-between - to that word. Taking the concept generally, there appear to be two common elements: 1) that soul, as an individuated yet highly rarefied sense-of-self, exists (whether eternally or not is often the driving question); and 2), that this soul, as an individuated yet rarefied sense-of-self, possesses some fundamental attributes.Thus, if you want to understand the historical trajectory of this term within Western Civilization, you might pick up the Bible, or alternatively you also might pick up a copy of Plato’s Phaedrus. There, some 2,500 years ago, set in a culture embued with heroics, a profound sense of curiosity and, perhaps just as profound, a sense of the divinity of life, Plato embarked on an exploration of this concept. Set within the mythical Palinode, Plato described soul (psyche, ψυχή) as a self-moving eternal principle that secondarily possessed a tripartite division. After positing this definition and this structure he proceeded in a highly nuanced way to explore how this conception could (or would) help us to philosophically understand and transformationally position ourselves relative to the activities of both erotic loving and rhetorical knowing. Plato’s exploration of soul then, in the Phaedrus, occurring as it did at the dawn of Western civilization’s attempts to reflexively question itself, took place within a dialog filled with myths. The question naturally arises, how should we approach this mythic element in Plato? And specifically, how did Plato conceive of myth’s truth status as well as its relationship to reason within this dialog?Daniel Werner’s “Myth and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus” is a book that asks precisely these questions. It is a well-researched read, interesting and helpful for scholars and novices alike. Thus, Werner’s deeply contextualized, insightful analysis explores how Plato used myth in the Phaedrus to express notions about the soul and its constitution that might otherwise evade a purely rational means of knowing and/or explication. He argues that for Plato, myth’s truth status is neither exclusively dogmatic nor debunking but somewhere in-between. Simultaneously, Werner also argues that, like Plato, he is not out to glorify myth nor to argue that Plato’s use of it here is intended to be a vehicle for expressing ideas that exclusively “transcend reason” or “lie beyond the capabilities of rational argument” (something he terms the Yogic View). Thus here, in his book, Werner tries to show that while Plato took pains to illumine the inherent strengths and weaknesses of myth, at the same time and also somewhat paradoxically, he used these same myths to both define and delimit the scope of the dialectical method.This paradox - and the epistemic horizon it implicates - deserve more attention (I think) than Werner (or even Plato) might have been willing to grant. If we return to the general points concerning soul that were mentioned above, we can see that Plato defined soul first and foremost as an eternal principle. This was accomplished by embedding a logical proof within the Palinode myth. The proof, which argued for eternality, was based on the perception of bodily self-motion. (Such a thesis could make sense to an age which defined motion through the sense perceptions of the naked eye; finer resolution visual tools now render such a thesis inviable, or at the very least, just kick the self-motion-thesis-can down the road.)But conceiving of soul as an individuating (that is, separating) aspect connected to the sense-of-self was in fact something presupposed by Plato. And dissolving this separation, as a concept, constitutes in essence the Yogic View referred to by Werner. Thus, this concept (the sense of separateness apparently entailed in defining one’s sense of self) appears to have been off Plato’s philosophic radar. In fact, Werner argues that, due to Plato’s clear emphasis on dialectical (propositional) methods of inquiry (and not myth per se), he cannot be construed to promote the meditational methods used to effect such a dissolution. I would agree with Werner’s assessment and further add that Plato’s conception of the soul was inextricably linked to his recognition of the animated and animating bodily energies of self-motion referred to earlier, a phenomenon which Vedanta calls the “I am the body idea”.Relative to structure, since soul as principle was proven to exist eternally in the Palinode, Plato, still within the Palinode suggests through the use of an analogy, that it possesses an ontologically scaled tripartite structure. The structure being: intellect, courageous passion and bodily impulses (for sex, food, sleep, etc…). But how he has come to derive these three elements is never clearly stated (here, it is argued for in Republic). And due to the implications of soul’s eternal existence (described through the permutations of lifetimes and/or even animal embodiments) the presence of such a structure suggests the possibility - even necessity - of individual purification. The practice of “divine” philosophy, then, as purification, meant enlisting the help of the courageous-passions to bolster the energetically weaker intellect, as they remained united in their effort to hold the anarchic bodily impulses – or those of others – at bay. This purifying practice then was centered in the intellect which, in its turn, relied on revelations proceeding from the higher realms of both Gods and Forms.Myth then, as it was used by Plato in the Phaedrus, explored the eternal nature of the soul, its fate after death and its structural components: concepts which could only be intelligent guess-work for an upward reaching dialectical inquiry. Both Plato and Werner admit as much: “In myth (no less than in argument) Plato can put forward only a guess regarding the fate of the soul, while consciously acknowledging that it is only a guess; in myth he can offer an image of the nature of the soul, while consciously acknowledging that it is only an image; and in myth he can tell us something about the Forms, while consciously acknowledging that their full nature eludes description” (Werner, page 102). This whole structure then, though only a likely story, has in fact influenced not only the practice of philosophy but also the practice of embodied living (in varying degrees) for 2500 years. Dialectic’s epistemic horizon here, teased by Platonic myth, might remain impenetrable as long as the experience of psychological dissolution, arising from the Yogic View’s meditative method, is viewed as having little to offer the arsenal of Western Philosophy’s concepts. If that were to change, much could change. Werner’s book is, as is Plato’s Phaedrus, then, a step in the right direction. Bravo!