Against Knowledge Closure

ISBN: 9781108578059 出版年：2019 页码：256 Marc Alspector-kelly Cambridge University Press

Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent s knows p, recognizes that p implies q, and believes q because it is implied by p, then s knows q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against knowledge closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, marc alspector-kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure.