Acknowledgements Part I. Mathematical Practice and its Puzzles: 1. Metaphysical inertness 2. Metaphysical inertness and reference 3. The virtues of (second-order) theft 4. Intuitions about reference and axiom systems 5. Comparing mathematical terms and empirical terms I 6. Comparing mathematical terms and empirical terms II 7. The epistemic role puzzle 8. Benacerraf's puzzle 9. Comparing puzzles 10. Quine's approach I 11. Quine's approach II Part II. The Stuff of Mathematics: Posits and Algorithms: 12. Introduction 13. An initial picture 14. Application and truth 15. Systems, application and truth 16. Quine's objections to truth by convention 17. Grades of ontological commitment 18. Multiply interpreting systems 19. Intuitions about reference revisited Part III. The Geography of the A Priori: 20. Introduction 21. Algorithms again 22. Some observations on metamathematics 23. Incorrigible co-empiricalness 24. Why there are no incorrigible co-empirical truths 25. Normative considerations, the success of applied mathematics, concluding thoughts Appendix Bibliography Index.
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