The Contents of Visual Experience

ISBN: 9780195305296 出版年：2011 页码：233 Siegel, Susanna Oxford University Press

Introduction: Seeing John Malkovich The Content View Why does it matter whether the Rich Content View is true? How can we decide whether the Rich Content View is true? Part I: Contents Chapter 1: Experiences 1.1 States of seeing and phenomenal states 1.2 Visual perceptual experiences Chapter 2: The Content View 2.1 Contents as accuracy conditions 2.2 The Argument from Accuracy 2.3 A flaw in the Argument from Accuracy 2.4 The Argument from Appearing 2.5 Two objections from 'looks', 'appears' and their cognates 2.6 The significance of the Content View Chapter 3: How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? 3.1 Introspection 3.2 Naturalistic theories of content 3.3 The method of phenomenal contrast Part II: Properties Chapter 4: Kinds 4.1 The examples 4.2 The premises 4.3 Content externalism Chapter 5: Causation 5.1 The Causal Thesis 5.2 Michotte's results 5.3 Unity in experience 5.4 Non-causal contents 5.5 Raw feels 5.6 Non-sensory experiences Part III: Objects Chapter 6: The Role of Objects in the Contents of Experience 6.1 Strong and Weak Veridicality 6.2 The contents of states of seeing 6.3 The contents of phenomenal states 6.4 Phenomenal states: Internalism vs. Pure Disjunctivism 6.5 Why Internalism? Chapter 7: Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience 7.1 Subject-independence and Perspectival Connectedness 7.2 The Good and the Odd 7.3 Complex contents 7.4 Objections and replies Chapter 8: The Strong Content View revisited