Morality without Foundations —— A Defense of Ethical Contextualism

Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations is an indispensable contribution to contemporary metaethics, as it challenges deeply engrained assumptions of the field to articulate a new and exciting theory of moral irrealism. The book proceeds by articulating the criteria by which a metaethical theory must succeed; how the (at the time) most plausible version of moral realism (Cornell realism) could not satisfy both criteria; a substantial argument against irrealism and what is to be learned from it; taking this lesson in hand, the development of contextualist moral semantics; and a contextualist moral epistemology. The other reviewer has an excellently concise summary of Timmons' main metaphysical/semantic thesis, so I will not repeat it here. My general conclusion on Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations is that it is a fantastic read, filled with fascinating ideas and unique perspectives in metaethics, but ultimately doesn’t offer a very plausible positive theory. For his theories on metaphysics, moral semantics, and moral epistemology to succeed, the notions of morally engaged and detached perspectives need to work, which would require that certain very particular practices and activities from those positions be possible, and as those activities are not possible, distinguishing morally engaged and morally detached perspectives is unworkable, and with it, Timmons’ overall theory.

This is the best book I've read in metaphysically naturalistic metaethics. Moral Nonnaturalism and Supernaturalism are, for good reasons, out of the picture for the metaphysical naturalist. This leaves only Moral Naturalism as a naturalistically acceptable position within the Realist camp. But there have been big problems with the Moral Naturalist's accommodation program ever since Moore up through Mackie. This book bolsters these earlier criticisms and applies them to new "Nonreductive" forms of Moral Naturalism. Now the only place for the metaphysical naturalist to look is in the Irrealist camp. But reductive irrealist projects don't seem to do a good job at accommodating moral commonsense. For instance, moral discourse seems to be fact-stating or assertoric. The emotivists had to deny this. If you're like me, you went with Mackie and the error theory i.e. (1) moral discourse IS fact-stating (assertoric), (2) there are NO moral facts, (3) therefore all (affirmative) moral statements are FALSE. In this brilliant book, Timmons provides an account of an irrealist metaethic that fits into the general area (Nonreductive Irrealist) of Mackie's error theory: once again, (1) moral discourse IS fact-stating (assertoric), (2) there are NO moral facts, (3) therefore... but wait a minute! With the contextualist account of truth construed as "correct assertibility," moral statements don't have to be false! Timmons' theory does the best job so far of naturalistically accommodating morality and the contextualist account of truth presented in this book can have FAR reaching consequences for the metaphysical naturalist. Just to give one example that can be easily generalized: the nominalist no longer has to embrace an "error theory" about properties (or any abstracta for that matter). For more reading on the contextualist account of truth, see almost any article by Mark Timmons and/or Terence Horgan.

Mark Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations is an indispensable contribution to contemporary metaethics, as it challenges deeply engrained assumptions of the field to articulate a new and exciting theory of moral irrealism. The book proceeds by articulating the criteria by which a metaethical theory must succeed; how the (at the time) most plausible version of moral realism (Cornell realism) could not satisfy both criteria; a substantial argument against irrealism and what is to be learned from it; taking this lesson in hand, the development of contextualist moral semantics; and a contextualist moral epistemology. The other reviewer has an excellently concise summary of Timmons' main metaphysical/semantic thesis, so I will not repeat it here.My general conclusion on Timmons’ Morality Without Foundations is that it is a fantastic read, filled with fascinating ideas and unique perspectives in metaethics, but ultimately doesn’t offer a very plausible positive theory. For his theories on metaphysics, moral semantics, and moral epistemology to succeed, the notions of morally engaged and detached perspectives need to work, which would require that certain very particular practices and activities from those positions be possible, and as those activities are not possible, distinguishing morally engaged and morally detached perspectives is unworkable, and with it, Timmons’ overall theory.

This is the best book I've read in metaphysically naturalistic metaethics. Moral Nonnaturalism and Supernaturalism are, for good reasons, out of the picture for the metaphysical naturalist. This leaves only Moral Naturalism as a naturalistically acceptable position within the Realist camp. But there have been big problems with the Moral Naturalist's accommodation program ever since Moore up through Mackie. This book bolsters these earlier criticisms and applies them to new "Nonreductive" forms of Moral Naturalism. Now the only place for the metaphysical naturalist to look is in the Irrealist camp. But reductive irrealist projects don't seem to do a good job at accommodating moral commonsense. For instance, moral discourse seems to be fact-stating or assertoric. The emotivists had to deny this. If you're like me, you went with Mackie and the error theory i.e. (1) moral discourse IS fact-stating (assertoric), (2) there are NO moral facts, (3) therefore all (affirmative) moral statements are FALSE. In this brilliant book, Timmons provides an account of an irrealist metaethic that fits into the general area (Nonreductive Irrealist) of Mackie's error theory: once again, (1) moral discourse IS fact-stating (assertoric), (2) there are NO moral facts, (3) therefore... but wait a minute! With the contextualist account of truth construed as "correct assertibility," moral statements don't have to be false!Timmons' theory does the best job so far of naturalistically accommodating morality and the contextualist account of truth presented in this book can have FAR reaching consequences for the metaphysical naturalist. Just to give one example that can be easily generalized: the nominalist no longer has to embrace an "error theory" about properties (or any abstracta for that matter).For more reading on the contextualist account of truth, see almost any article by Mark Timmons and/or Terence Horgan.