The Christian God

Very good, and thorough. Though, not always convincing.

He divides his work into metaphysics and theology. Initially, this is a valid move (especially if you think substance metaphysics is necessary to Trinitarian and gospel proclamation). From there, things get complicated. Swinburne repeats a lot of material from Evolution of the Soul. He makes a number of good points on necessity and type-token identity. With regards to theology, Swinburne begins on a promising note and defines the concept of God along these lines (which I shall denote with a number): (1) “there exists necessarily and eternally a person (?) essentially bodiless, omnipresent, creator and sustainer of any universe there may be, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and a source of moral obligation” (125). Well and good. God’s foreknowledge (2) “God knows at each period of time all those propositions which it is logically possible that he entertain then and which if entertained by him then are true” (131). This raises problems, so Swinburne thinks, with God’s foreknowledge of future, free human actions. So: (2’) God has knowledge of all propositions which it is possible that he entertain at that time. Which seems to be: (2*) God’s free knowledge is limited by other agents’ free choices (133) This is a highly unsatisfying conclusion. We shall offer a more substantial critique later. Swinburne rejects the Boethian view of God and Time (though he erroneously ascribes that view to the Bible, 139). That view goes as follows: (3) God’s simultaneous existing at any single moment, where moment is defined as instant. However, earlier considerations (chapter 4) defined “state of affairs” as lasting for a period of time. So Swinburne reads the dilemmas “God is either sovereign for an instant, which means he is not sovereign over a state of affairs.” He clarifies the criticism: (3’) If God brings about states of affairs, not only just merely knowing them, then his actions must precede the events themselves. The Divine Nature RS defines the divine nature as “pure, unlimited bodily power” able to act in all places without intermediary. God’s simple essence, therefore, is monadanic. It belongs to him in virtue of who he is, not in relation to some(thing)one else. The Trinity Convoluted section of limited value. Some good remarks on Richard of St. Victor. Perfect love involves there being someone else to whom to be generous, and also perfect loving involves a third individual, the loving of whom could be shared with a second. The Father needs a socium et condilectum (an ally and fellow-loved) in his loving. Great discussion on the communicatio idiomata. He openly sides with Calvin. “They rob Christ of his humanity.” “Total interpenetration rules out the divided mind view which alone does justice to the New Testament” (211). Of course Swinburne is correct, but instead of saying “divided mind,” let’s stick with the classical model of Christ having two minds (because of two natures). The concept of the divided mind, if not taken literally, comes into play in how the two minds interact. Criticisms In rejecting “Platonism” Swinburne thinks he is holding to a modified nominalism. That may be so, but he construes realism (or Platonism) as holding that abstract properties are substances, which, on his take, is absurd. He reasons that properties like wisdom have to be instantiated and not free-floating. If wisdom is to be a substance, then yes, it has to be instantiated. But if wisdom is a universal or an essence, then it doesn’t. Swinburne also thinks that Platonism (or realism) posits the forms as independent of God (which seems an odd criticism on Swinburne's part, since he believes that the "Good" exists apart from God's command and nature). Further, if, following Maximus the Confessor, the forms collectively are the [I]Logoi[/I], and the [I]Logoi[/I] is the refracted Logos, who is Christ, then we can posit the reality of the Forms yet maintain they are not apart from God. Whether this is true or not isn't the point. It is logically coherent and serves as a rebuttal to Swinburne's nominalism. Regarding God’s foreknowledge, Swinburne’s position in (2*) assumes that if the future is certain (and presumably, if God’s knowing it makes it certain), then it makes no sense to speak of agents’ having free choices. But even Arminians like William Lane Craig know this is a category fallacy. Certainty is a predicate of persons, of knowers. Necessity is a predicate of events known (Craig, “The Middle Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, 127-128). Bruce McCormack clarifies: “God’s foreknowledge gives him certainty with regard to what will happen. Whether the events God knows with certainty take place necessarily or contigently is a function of the natural and historical conditions under which they take place” (McCormack, “The Actuality of God,” in Engaging the Doctrine of God, 205). Those are the main criticisms of Swinburne’s work. Other criticisms are minor, if more immediate. The opening section is heavy on metaphysics, which is good, but it isn’t always clear how the discussion will be relevant to his later treatment on the doctrine of God. Evaluation I would not make this my foundational book on the doctrine of God.